The article aims to investigate the role of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (Minustah) in the social and political landscape of the country, and how
it failed to bring a sustainable contribution for peacebuilding and stabilisation, despite specific positive outcomes, especially for violence reduction and Security
Sector Reform (SSR) during the period of 2006-2010. The intervention in 2004 based on violent coercion and the lack of a peace process and political settlement
led the operation to aggravate, instead of treating, the social and political conflicts present in the country, contributing for the (re)production of predatory political
economies, violent contestation and further social and political fragmentation. I propose that this outcome in Haiti, similar to other cases of countries with international interventions, can be better understood with a critical assessment of the peace-as-statebuilding paradigm of international interveners, and its disregard for the local legitimation of peace processes, political settlements and the building of vstate institutions.
