Skip to main navigation menu Skip to main content Skip to site footer

Articles

Vol. 40 No. 3 (2020)

Trusting the Dependent Judiciary: Evidence From Ecuador

DOI
https://doi.org/10.4067/S0718-090X2020005000120
Submitted
October 29, 2020
Published
2020-10-29

Abstract

The literature on judicial politics has assumed that judicial independence and trust in the judiciary go hand in hand. Based on evidence from Ecuador, I show that citizens’ trust and support for the judiciary can increase despite decreasing levels of judicial independence, which I argue is largely driven by citizens’ approval of executive performance in office. Popular presidents send cues to their constituents regarding how and why the judiciary should be trusted, despite its institutional flaws. These results open the possibility to question whether public trust in the judiciary necessarily stems from the presence of independent judicial institutions.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.